Michigan Law Review
Volume 83

Issue 4

1985

The Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the
Executive
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the International Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, The Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the Executive, 83
MICH. L. REV. 969 (1985).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol83/iss4/29

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

February 1985]

Politics, Government and Public Affairs

969

THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE EXECUTIVE. By Loch K Johnson. New York: New
York University Press. 1984. Pp. xx, 206. $30.
Since the first days of our Republic, Americans have faced the intractable question of the proper balance of congressional and executive
roles in the conduct of foreign affairs. The question is inherent in our
constitutional system of checks and balances and raises difficult
problems of how we as a nation can act effectively and coherently
while still preserving democratic control over our foreign policy. It is
an issue over which Congress and the President have differed many
times in our history and has been the source of unending debate and
discussion among political commentators and observers. It is to this
important question that Professor Johnson 1 addresses himself in The
Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the
Executive.
Johnson does not make a major substantive contribution to the discussion of congressional and executive roles in foreign affairs. Rather,
in simple, succinct style, he provides students of international affairs
with a helpful description of the making of international agreements
by the United States. His work is intended to go beyond the superficial treatment given by many textbooks on U.S. foreign affairs in order
to clarify the wide variety of techniques and objectives of formal diplomacy, and to explore the sharp disa~eements among policymakers and
scholars concerning the proper executive-legislative balance in the making of international agreements. [P. xvi.]

Johnson's further purpose in this book is to advocate a larger role
for Congress in the conduct of our foreign affairs. Our current foreign
policy, he argues, suffers from an "institutional disequilibrium" and is
characterized by a "freewheeling" executive and nonparticipative legislature (pp. xvii-xviii). After briefly touching upon the complex
problems associated with the democratic control of agreement making, Johnson ends with some modest but practical suggestions to increase congressional involvement in the making of foreign
commitments.
The most interesting and distinctive aspect of The Making ofInternational Agreements is the method Johnson has chosen to examine his
topic. Unsatisfied with the arm-chair analyst's approach, Johnson
gathered concrete data on which to base his analysis and discussion.
He collected and analyzed almost 6000 bilateral, nonclassified international agreements2 entered into by the United States from 1946 to
1. Loch Johnson is professor of political science at the University of Georgia. He is a former
staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
2. According to Johnson, 89% of America's agreements since 1946 have been bilateral agreements. P. 49. Johnson gathered 5,991 such agreements from United States Statutes at Large,
which lists international agreements prior to 1950, United States Treaties and Other International
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1972.3 The result is welcome empirical groundwork for the consideration of American agreement making. The firmer factual foundation,
regrettably absent in many commentaries, sheds valuable new light on
the question of balancing congressional and presidential involvement
in foreign affairs.
Johnson examines his data from several perspectives. One of these
is the question of what sorts of countries have entered into agreements
with the United States during the years 1946 to 1972. This inquiry
provides some general conclusions about the character of our international partnerships, but unfortunately Johnson's examination is short
on specific, detailed analysis. For instance, he conceived only three
abstract types of political regimes, democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian, and tries to fit all countries into these analytical boxes.
Moreover, he fails to list what countries fall into which category, or to
provide any adequate definition or description of these amorphous categories. He says only:
Democratic regimes are conceptualized as states where parties or groups
compete for office in relatively free elections; authoritarian, or anticommunist "right-wing" regimes, as states where political power is in the
hands of a single ruler, the military, or a civilian oligarchy without the
benefit of free elections; and totalitarian, or communist "left-wing" regimes, as states where the Communist party or a Marxist group holds
the preponderance of political power within the society.4

The reader is left wondering how accurate or objective Johnson's unstated classifications may be. Nevertheless, the broad picture conveyed by Johnson's data is interesting, even though imprecise and of
little use for specific analysis or conclusions. The general picture is of
a relative predominance of agreements with "democratic" regimes
over agreements with either "authoritarian" or "totalitarian" regimes.
It also seems a greater number of agreements were made with "authoritarian" than with "totalitarian" regimes. This observation may mean
little more than that the United States has had more ties with "rightwing" than with "left-wing" countries - perhaps a foregone conclusion considering that Johnson's sample of agreements is taken from
the Cold War period.
In a more useful avenue of analysis, Johnson examines his collection of agreements according to type of agreement and according to
subject matter. He first conceives of three different types of agreeAgreements, which lists all agreements entered into force after 1949, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, a set of numbered, pamphlet copies of international agreements, and the Digest
of United States Practice In International Law. These compilations are all published by the U.S.
Government Printing Office. P. 8 n.12.
3. In a footnote Johnson writes that the years 1946 through 1972 were analyzed because they
mark the limits of the Cold War period. P. 8 n.13. However, nowhere in the book does Johnson
limit his conclusions to Cold War international politics or to those conditions which characterize
a Cold War foreign policy.
4. P. 32 (footnote omitted).
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ments and categorizes all the agreements into these general classes.
There are (1) agreements based in whole or in part upon the constitutional authority and power of the President, termed "executive agreements," (2) agreements made strictly pursuant to congressional
legislation, termed "statutory agreements," and (3) agreements made
according to the treaty process under article II, section 2, of the Constitution, termed simply "treaties." 5 He then classifies each agreement
according to its general subject matter: (1) military; (2) economic; (3)
cultural-technical (including health and education); (4) transportation-communications; or (5) diplomatic (including passports, claims,
and war claims).
In analyzing the agreements according to their subject matter,
Johnson discovered a consistently greater number of economic agreements than any other. Economic agreements accounted for thirtyseven percent of all the agreements from 1946 through 1972 (p. 15).
They were the most prevalent international agreement in every presidential administration except Truman's, in which cultural-technical
agreements surpassed economic ones. Cultural-technical agreements
were the second most common sort of agreement during this period,
followed by military agreements (p. 17). Transportation, communication, and diplomatic agreements were the least frequent during this
period (p. 18).
The clearest and most compelling conclusion from all of Johnson's
research and analysis is revealed in his classifications of agreements
according to their type. Johnson found that his second category of
agreements, the statutory agreements, were the overwhelmingly predominant form of international agreement utilized by the United
States during this period. Almost eighty-seven percent of all the
agreements between 1946 to 1972 were statutory agreements. The
statutory agreement was the most common form of agreement in every
subject matter area (p. 19). The predominance of this form of agreement held true in each year of every presidential administration during
this period. At its lowest, the proportion of statutory agreements
among total international agreements in any one year was still sixtyseven percent. The proportion went as high as ninty-five percent in
1962 (p. 13).
If only because of the sheer number of statutory agreements, one
might have expected Johnson to concentrate his analysis on this form
of agreement. He does not. Instead Johnson focuses on executive
agreements, even though they accounted for only 7.4% of all the
agreements made between 1946 through 1972 (p. 13). One suspects
5. In making these classifications, Johnson relied heavily upon a Department of State publication, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OTHER THAN TREATIES, 1946-1968: A LIST WITH CITATION OF THEIR LEGAL BASIS (1969), and its updating supplements. For some agreements he
also relied upon telephone interviews with the Office of the Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs. P. 8
n.14.

972

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 83:965

this emphasis is a reflection of Professor Johnson's personal view on
the proper roles of Congress and th~ President in international affairs,
a view unaffected by the force of his own empirical findings. Johnson
seems entrenched in his perception of "freewheeling executive discretion in the making of international agreements" (p. xviii), notwithstanding the predominant number of agreements made strictly
pursuant to congressional authorization. It is his thesis, he says, that
although the Congress has participated in the making of many international agreements, major commitments - especially in the military and
intelligence areas - have been decided by the President alone or, worse
still, by non-elected officials in the executive branch. [P. 158.]

Attempting to explain the inconsistency between his position and
the empirical findings, Johnson argues that those many statutory
agreements indicate only a procedural involvement of Congress. 6 He
writes that
earlier studies, as well as the author's own interviews and observations,
suggest that the legislative branch is often deficient in the substantive
area - the meaningful details of policy - despite its considerable procedural involvement in the approval of international commitments. 7

However, the one and only "earlier study" Johnson cites, Theodore J.
Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 8 does not establish that those statutory
agreements--were merely procedural rubber stamps or that Congress
was just giving the "official green light" to the executive (p. 26). Nor
do the author's private interviews with unknown persons or his personal, unelaborate9 observations support the assertion that Congress
has had no substantive role in the making of international agreements.
Despite his attempts, Johnson simply fails to show the irrelevance of
his own clearest empirical finding. 9
It is the "normative theme" of this book, Johnson says, "that foreign policy should be conducted on the basis of a partnership between
the executive and legislative branches" (p. xviii). That is a fine plati6. Johnson's attempt to distinguish procedure and substance, and to characterize a procedural role as somehow insignificant, is highly problematic. A procedural requirement can be the
source of considerable power and influence, and may significantly affect so-called substantive
matters. The most obvious example is the procedural requirement of Senate approval in treaty
making. This constitutional procedural requirement gives the Senate significant influence to
shape a treaty, as well as the power to reject a treaty.
7. P. 26 (footnote omitted).
8. T. LoWJ, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979).
9. The reader also should be aware that (intentionally or not) Johnson's classification of types
of agreements maximizes the number of executive agreements while minimizing the number of
statutory agreements. He counted any agreement based in whole or in part upon the constitutional authority of the President only as an executive agreement. Thus, even if an agreement was
made pursuant to congressional enactment, the invocation of the constitutional authority of the
executive brought it out of the statutory agreement class and into the executive agreement class.
P. 8. Of course this creates a statistical bias in favor of executive agreements and against statutory agreements. Therefore, the high number of statutory agreements reported by Johnson is
probably even higher in reality, while the number of executive agreements may be overstated.
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tude, but the real issue is the balance of power between Congress and
the President within that partnership. Johnson obviously believes that
Congress has not had enough power in the past and that the balance
should shift in Congress' favor. He even proposes some interesting,
specific ideas on how to further that end. 10 In his zeal to make the
case for a greater congressional role, however, Johnson has overlooked
a promising, largely unexplored possibility for achieving a properly
balanced foreign policy partnership: the statutory agreement. The
statutory agreement is a flexible form of international agreement, capable of incorporating and accommodating both Congress and the
President in the conduct of foreign affairs. 11 The already wide use of
the statutory agreement evidenced by Johnson's data means that it
would likely face fewer obstacles as the vehicle for a balanced foreign
policy partnership. Moreover, Congress' control of the purse strings
would guarantee it the opportunity for a significant role in the making
of international agreements, notwithstanding Johnson's assertions to
the contrary. Thus, the statutory agreement holds interesting and
promising potential for the management and maintenance of the foreign policy partnership between Congress and the President. It is disappointing, then, that The Making of International Agreements
devotes so little attention to this instrument of foreign affairs, especially after pointing out its impressive empirical significance.

10. Johnson recommends: (1) a computerized storage and access system for this information
so Congress can monitor more effectively the making of international agreements; (2) notification
to Congress of all international agreements and their substance before they are supposed to become effective; (3) sample audits of the type and extent of United States' agreements with different countries to insure complete and accurate reporting by the executive; (4) upgraded recordkeeping and reporting standards within the executive; and (5) a comprehensive legislative review
of the procedure for making agreements. Pp. 164-73.
11. One of Johnson's own case studies shows the great capacity of the statutory agreement to
accommodate both branches of government in their competing interests. In September 1975, the
United States, Israel, and Egypt entered into the Sinai Agreements. These agreements, among
other things, provided for the participation of American technicians in an early warning defense
system to be established between the forces of Israel and Egypt. Congress objected to this agreement, arguing that an agreement placing Americans in a potential war zone required a treaty and
not merely the President's executive agreement. Ultimately, the dispute was settled between the
two branches by the compromise of using a statutory agreement. Johnson writes: "What some
wanted to be a treaty and others an executive agreement finally became a statutory agreement in
order for the Congress to give its approval to the commitment." P. 162. In this way, both
branches were involved in the agreement in a genuine, balanced partnership.

